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Why preemption
proponents are wrong
Corporate defendants’ claim that the effect of state tort actions is equivalent to
state positive law has no merit. The reality is that consumer protection can be
guaranteed only when tort remedies work in tandem with federal regulation.
BRIAN WOLFMAN

T

he basic idea of federal preemption is easily stated: It is a constitutionally mandated principle
that demands that federal law trumps
state law when the two conflict or in
the rare instances when a federal law is
so comprehensive that there’s no role
left for state law to fill. But in practice,
courts have often had difficulty applying
the principle.
For plaintiff lawyers, preemption is
an ever-present worry. When your client has been injured by a defective car,
truck, medical device, boat, tobacco
product, pesticide, or mislabeled drug,
or has been victimized by a bank or
other lending institution, the defendant
will probably assert that federal law preempts your client’s state law damages
claim. You can expect this argument no
matter how weak the federal regulatory
scheme or how attenuated the connection between that scheme and the harms
your client suffered or the state law
duties under which your client seeks a
remedy.1
But defendants’ and tort “reformers’”
pro-preemption arguments do not reflect
current preemption doctrine as established by the courts. A common—and
false—argument for preemption, for example, is that state tort law necessarily
interferes with federal regulatory objectives.
Moreover, preemption of state tort
law is a bad idea. Immunizing the makers of products that cause injury simply

because, for instance, these products
have been approved for marketing by a
federal agency harms both the injured
people and society generally.

An unsound theory
The theoretical basis that defendants
offer for preemption of state tort law
is not firmly established in preemption
doctrine. I don’t mean the detailed comparison between a particular federal regulatory regime and the state tort claims
asserted in a particular case. There, as
the case law shows, the devil is in the
details.2 I am referring to defendants’ efforts to equate the effect of tort law—of

seeking damages on the ground that the
plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the
device’s defective design or inadequate
labeling is also preempted.
In other words, is the effect of positive law (in this case, a state’s positive
law requirement that a product not be
marketed) the same as a jury’s damages verdict (in this case, a state’s award
of damages based on a design defect)?
This is an important question because
defendants have relied heavily on the
argument that positive law and common law damages exert the same regulatory effect and that when positive law
is preempted, common law should be as
well.

Defendants have relied heavily on the argument
that positive law and common law damages exert
the same regulatory effect and that when positive
law is preempted, common law should be as well.
state law damages actions—with positive state regulation.
For example, assume that a federal agency has approved the marketing of a particular medical device as it
is currently designed, manufactured,
and labeled and that a state’s ban on
the marketing of this device would be
preempted on the ground that it would
conflict with federal law. The question,
then, is whether a state law tort suit

Does the Supreme Court buy into
this equivalence between positive state
regulation and a jury’s award of damages? To put it mildly, the Court has been
unpredictable.
Its first statement on this topic was
in the labor law context, in San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon.3
Garmon involved a business’s attempt
to prevent union picketing by bringing a
suit under California law seeking an in-

junction and damages. In an early stage
of the litigation, the Supreme Court ruled
that the injunctive relief was preempted
by the National Labor Relations Act.4
The Court also rejected the attempt to
impose damages under California law:
[State] regulation can be as effectively
exerted through an award of damages as
through some form of preventive relief.
The obligation to pay compensation can
be, indeed is designed to be, a potent
method of governing conduct and controlling policy. Even the states’ salutary effort

In 1992, the Court seemed to change
course. A plurality opinion in the famous tobacco liability case, Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc., relied on the
language from Garmon quoted above
and concluded that the Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, which
requires specific warnings on cigarette
packages, preempted some, but not all,
tort claims based on a failure to warn
about the dangers of smoking.8
This section of the Cipollone decision was premised in part on particular

The Supreme Court has said it is ‘perfectly rational’
for Congress to preempt state positive law but not
common law claims, which ‘perform an important
remedial role in compensating accident victims.’
to redress private wrongs or grant compensation for past harm cannot be exerted
to regulate activities that are potentially
subject to the exclusive federal regulatory
scheme.5

Garmon was not a products liability
case, and federal labor laws, unlike most
federal statutes that regulate consumer
products and services, authorize monetary remedies. Garmon thus presented a
different situation from the medical device example above because neither the
relevant federal regulatory statute nor
any other federal law provides a means
to compensate people harmed by medical devices.6
Nevertheless, it is easy to see why
preemption-seeking defendants rely so
heavily on Garmon. Its exclusive focus
on tort damages as a regulatory, rather
than a compensatory, tool is useful to
defendants seeking to equate positive
law with tort law.
But Garmon arose in a context quite
different from modern tort law, and even
after Garmon, the prevailing assumption
in the courts was that regulatory standards and state compensation schemes
occupied separate spheres.7 Indeed, until
the 1990s, the Supreme Court had never
held a state law tort claim preempted
by federal regulation, at least not where
federal law itself did not provide a right
of action for damages.

language of the 1969 act that purportedly pointed in the direction of preemption
of common law duties.9 But it also relied
on Garmon’s claim that damages liability can have, and is intended to have, the
same effect on the defendant’s future
conduct as would positive state regulation. Since then, defendants in products
liability and similar cases have relied on
this language from Garmon and Cipollone ad nauseam, in an effort to show
that state tort law and state positive law
have the same regulatory effect—that is,
that they are inherently the same.
But not so fast. In the majority portion of the Cipollone decision—which
addressed the preemptive effect of an
earlier version of the cigarette-labeling
law (the 1965 Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act)—just a few
paragraphs above the endorsement of
Garmon, the same justice who wrote
the plurality opinion, Justice John Paul
Stevens, said something quite different:
that the 1965 act, because of its particular wording, preempts “only positive
enactments by legislatures or administrative agencies that mandate particular
warning labels” and “not . . . common
law damages actions.”10 The Court held
that although the 1965 act preempted
state positive law labeling requirements,
it did not preempt any state damages actions, even those premised on a failure

to warn.
In responding to the tobacco industry’s arguments that the 1965 act
preempted state law damages claims
based on the industry’s failure to warn,
the Court seemed to reject the Garmon
viewpoint as a general, overarching justification for preemption: “[T]here is no
general, inherent conflict between federal preemption of state warning requirements and the continued vitality of state
common law damages actions.”11
The internal tension in Cipollone
carried over to a 1996 medical device
preemption case, Medtronic v. Lohr.12
A plurality opinion, again authored by
Justice Stevens, suggested that a rational Congress could (and did) treat state
common law damages actions differently from positive state law,13 while the
dissenters and one concurring justice
generally equated the two.14

Divining congressional
intent
Although the Supreme Court’s confusion on this score runs deep, it is important to mention three rulings from
the Court that directly challenge the
premise that positive law and damages
liability are the same for preemption
purposes. First, in Goodyear Atomic
Corp. v. Miller, the Court considered
whether an Ohio administrative agency
could, consistent with federal preemption principles, award additional workers’ compensation benefits based on
violations of state safety standards at
a federally owned, privately operated
nuclear production facility.15
The Court held that the additional
award was not preempted. Acknowledging that state positive law safety requirements might be preempted, the Court
viewed damages liability as fundamentally different:
Congress’ reluctance to allow direct state
regulation of federal projects says little
about whether Congress was likewise
concerned with the incidental regulatory
effects arising from the enforcement of a
workers’ compensation law, like Ohio’s,
that provides an additional award when the
injury is caused by the breach of a safety
regulation. The effects of direct regulation on the operation of federal projects
are significantly more intrusive than the

incidental regulatory effects of such an additional award provision. [The] appellant
may choose to disregard Ohio safety regulations and simply pay an additional workers’ compensation award if an employee’s
injury is caused by a safety violation. We
believe Congress may reasonably determine that incidental regulatory pressure is
acceptable, whereas direct regulatory authority is not.16

The last sentence, which suggests
that Congress had thought about the differences between “incidental regulatory
pressure” and “direct regulatory authority,” seems a misstatement. Like most
federal regulatory statutes—even those
that expressly preempt state law—the
statutes relevant in Goodyear Atomic
had said nothing about preemption of
state law monetary liability. In reality,
the Court was saying that positive law
and damages liability do not exert the
same regulatory effect and that a reasonable Congress, if it had thought about
the question, would not have equated
the two in confronting the issue presented by the case.
Nor can the Garmon formulation be
squared with two more-recent Supreme
Court forays into tort preemption. In
Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, which
considered a preemption argument
based on the Federal Boat Safety Act
(FBSA), a young woman died tragically
when she fell overboard and was struck
by a boat’s propeller blades.17 One of the
questions the case presented was whether a state common law claim premised
on a boat manufacturer’s failure to install a propeller guard was preempted
by the FBSA’s express preemption provision—which, according to the manufacturer, preempted all positive law and
common law regarding boat safety.
The Court rejected that argument. It
noted that it is “perfectly rational” for
Congress to preempt state positive law
but not “common law claims, which—
unlike most administrative and legislative regulations—necessarily perform
an important remedial role in compensating accident victims.”18
This statement is important because,
generally, even when the Court has refused to find tort claims preempted and
has challenged the notion that tort law
exerts the same regulatory effect as pos-

itive law, it has not expressly touted tort
law’s remedial function. And tort law’s
ability to compensate the injured is one
way that tort law and positive administrative law requirements differ fundamentally.
Finally, in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, a 2005 case about whether the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act preempts state tort claims,
the Court overruled the pro-preemption
position of nearly every federal circuit
and about 30 state appellate courts.19
The Court confronted an express preemption provision that preempts state
law “requirements” when they differ
from, or add to, federal regulatory requirements.20 In holding that most (and
possibly all) of the plaintiff’s claims
were not preempted, the Court explained that a positive law “requirement
is a rule of law that must be obeyed; an
event, such as a jury verdict, that merely
motivates an optional decision, is not a
requirement.”21 The Court was making
the point that positive regulation has a
much more direct effect on conduct than
does a damages award.
Why are these cases important? Because if the basic theoretical justification for preemption—equating state
positive law and state tort law—is not
really a part of the legal landscape, then
defendants have only two things on

protector of its citizens’ health and safety.23
In short, once the overarching justification for tort preemption is gone, preemption proponents must come up with
some other, more case-specific, justification. They no longer have a knockout
punch.
A typical express preemption provision goes something like this: Preemption occurs where a state law “requirement” conflicts with a federal positive
law “requirement.”24 That language,
standing alone, doesn’t tell the courts
much about whether state tort law is or
is not preempted. If anything, because
the federal law “requirement” is indisputably a positive regulatory requirement, it makes sense to think of the state
law “requirement” as being one of positive law as well.25
And these ambiguous provisions sit
smack-dab in the middle of statutes enacted in the 1960s and 1970s to improve
consumer safety and health or financial
security, such as the Medical Device
Amendments or the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, to name
but two. And those statutes contain not
a word—not a single word—suggesting
that what Congress was really doing was
enacting massive tort “reform” more expansive than the express tort “reform”
statutes that Congress has been repeat-

To the extent that tort law exerts regulatory effect
on a drug maker, it does so only after repeated suits,
settlements, and findings of liability; even then
the cause-and-effect relationship is rarely clear.
which to hang their hats: highly ambiguous express preemption provisions created by Congresses that were striving to
increase protections for consumers, or,
even less plausibly, claims of implied
preemption arising from the interstices
of federal law.22
Neither of these assertions should
fare well if the courts consistently apply the presumption against preemption
of state law, which is said to apply with
particular force in tort cases because of
the state’s traditional role as the prime

edly unwilling to enact over the last 20
years.26
Let’s take one possible illustration of
such a claim’s implausibility. Is it possible that the Medical Device Amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act27—sponsored by Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) and passed in 1976 by
an overwhelmingly Democratic postWatergate Congress in response to
medical device tragedies such as the
Dalkon Shield saga28—were intended to
eliminate the right to recover under state

law for injuries caused by defective
FDA-approved medical devices? Some
people may believe that tort preemption
is a good thing, but they can’t seriously
believe that it arises from an enactment
like the Medical Device Amendments.
As Kennedy bluntly put it, “The legislation is written so that the benefit of
the doubt is always given to the consumer. After all, it is the consumer that
pays with his health and life for medical
device malfunctions.”29

duct of the regulated industry.
Contrast that direct regulatory power
with the tort system. Large industry players generally react slowly, and sometimes not at all, to liability pressures.
Most instances of liability are absorbed
without a change in the manufacturer’s
conduct, or at least the kind of change
that a regulator could bring about swiftly. As the District of Columbia Circuit
has recognized, the imposition of damages liability does not legally compel the

Even those inside the FDA have raised serious
questions about the agency’s ability to achieve its
mission. FDA employees have expressed alarm at
the improper pressure they felt to approve drugs.
A practical question
The doctrinal playing field regarding
preemption is therefore wide open. The
next question, then, is a practical one:
Does equating positive law with tort
law work as a practical matter? In other
words, does the equation make empirical sense? That’s an easy one, and the
answer is no.
As a matter of regulatory impact, it
is a huge leap from the proposition that
tort law is meant to (and does to some
degree) have a regulatory effect, to the
proposition that its impact is equivalent
to direct, positive law regulation.
When the FDA, for instance, wants to
get a food, drug, or device off the market, it can do so swiftly. It can actually
seize products, like David Kessler did
with misbranded orange juice when he
first became FDA commissioner.30 It can
deny regulatory approval; it can impose
advertising restrictions; it can demand
data. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act gives industries the right to oppose
agency action, but as a practical matter,
the agency generally can exert its positive law priorities with great force.
Of course, agencies often do not
exercise their full regulatory authority
because of indifference, insufficient resources, lack of political will, or “capture” by the regulated industry.31 But
federal agencies, if they wish to do so,
have the ability to quickly alter the con-

defendant to alter its future conduct.32
To the extent that tort law exerts a
regulatory effect on a drug manufacturer, it does so only after repeated suits,
settlements, and findings of liability—
and even then the cause-and-effect relationship is rarely clear. In many instances, even after an onslaught of lawsuits,
the manufacturer holds out for a long
time—or forever. The Supreme Court
put this well in Goodyear Atomic, when
it said that “the effects of direct regulation on the operation of federal projects
are significantly more intrusive than the
incidental regulatory effects of such an
additional award provision.”33
Of course, there is some symbiosis
here. The regulatory system exerts pressures on the tort system and vice versa,
both exert financial and political pressure on politicians and industry, and
both are capable of publicizing information that would otherwise stay locked
away in corporate file cabinets. But that
doesn’t alter the basic truth: There is no
reason to build a body of legal literature
and judicial doctrine on the equivalency
between tort and direct regulation when
that equivalency is not remotely accurate.

Compensatory role
Against this background, there are
two reasons why tort preemption is generally a bad idea. First, the tort system

has a nonregulatory component—compensation—that is virtually never a
component of the U.S. administrative
law system. To put it another way, federal agencies that regulate virtually never
compensate.
Unfortunately, much modern preemption doctrine and many legal academics,
intrigued by the theoretical regulatory
effect of tort as a means of social control, have not focused on the compensatory component. Yet the principal purpose of tort law—particularly in a world
where, at least in theory, the agencies
are already accomplishing their regulatory function—is compensation.
Compensation is what distinguishes
the tort system from the modern regulatory state. That is not to say that the creation and perpetuation of tort duties are
not intended to have an effect on future
conduct. They are. But, at the very least,
regulatory control and compensation
are major goals of tort law. That being
so, why should the compensation principle give way to the regulatory principle when there is a perceived “regulatory” conflict between tort law and the
administrative state? And why shouldn’t
the plaintiff’s interest in compensation
prevail, particularly given the current
political reality, in which federal law
provides neither comprehensive health
care nor accident insurance?
Given these political deficiencies and
the relatively weak regulatory effect of
tort, the compensation principle should
trump the regulation principle, at least
in the absence of the most direct types
of conflict between federal law and state
law (for instance, where federal law forbade boat propeller guards, and the state
law tort claim was premised on a duty
to provide one,34 or where federal law
prohibited air bags, and the state law tort
claim was premised on a duty to require
them35). In this regard, one conception
of strict products liability—in which
the law acknowledges that even socially beneficial products can cause grave
harm and allows those products on the
market but compensates those who are
injured—is perfectly consistent with a
regulatory system that seeks, but can
never fully achieve, optimal health and
safety benefits.36

The regulatory system is not intended to prevent all harm, nor could it—and
this is the second reason why preemption is generally a bad idea. Regulation
is meant to balance risks and benefits
(with the knowledge that injuries will
occur) in a highly imperfect system,
where regulators depend almost exclusively on profit-motivated sellers to
submit all available, relevant data—data
that changes over time, as new information emerges after a product is marketed
to the public.
Even if we assume that tort law exerts some regulatory pressure—and I
do—why wouldn’t we want it to do so?
The Supreme Court itself has seemed
to answer that question affirmatively,
understanding both that tort law does
not exert the same regulatory effect as
positive law and that it can apply useful pressure where the regulatory system
fails to achieve its full purposes.37
A present-day example helps illustrate the serious concerns raised by
a system that would tolerate both tort
preemption and regulatory failure. In a
regulatory preamble accompanying a
new FDA rule concerning drug labeling,
the agency has claimed that its labeling
rules preempt state tort claims based on
a drug manufacturer’s failure to warn.38
In other words, the agency maintains
that the principal type of state law damages claim raised by people injured by
drugs has been silently obliterated by
federal law—silently, because no federal statute or regulation remotely suggests such a result. As a legal matter, the
FDA’s view seems like a stretch for a
host of reasons, not the least of which is
that when Congress was considering the
legislation that became the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act in 1938—the legislation that authorizes the FDA to issue
labeling rules in the first place—it “rejected a provision in a draft of the original (FDCA) providing a federal cause of
action for damages because ‘a common
law right of action [already] exists.’”39
As my colleague Allison Zieve and I
have elsewhere explained, the FDA’s
preemption position has no legal support
and is not entitled to judicial deference.40
My point for present purposes is not
to undermine the FDA’s legal claim to

preemption, but to show why preemption would do violence to public safety
and to the agency’s mission. To put it
mildly, the FDA’s preemption plea is illtimed. Recently, two independent government reports have described the dangerous shortcomings in FDA oversight
of drug safety.
First, in a report issued in March
2006, the Government Accountability
Office concluded that the
FDA lacks clear and effective processes
for making decisions about, and providing management oversight of, postmarket
safety issues. The process has been limited
by a lack of clarity about how decisions
are made and about organizational roles,
insufficient oversight by management, and
data constraints.41

And more recently, a National Academies Institute of Medicine report,
prepared at the FDA’s request, found
that the drug safety system is impaired
by “serious resource constraints that
weaken the quality and quantity of the
science that is brought to bear on drug
safety; an organizational culture in [the
FDA] that is not optimally functional;
and unclear and insufficient regulatory
authorities particularly with respect to
enforcement.”42

propriately exclude or alter technical information or my conclusions in an FDA
scientific document.”44
Similarly, in a 2003 survey by the
FDA’s parent agency, the Department
of Health and Human Services, 18 percent of FDA physicians and scientists
who responded reported pressure to recommend that drugs be approved, even
when they had reservations about the
drugs’ safety, effectiveness, or quality,
and 66 percent lacked confidence that
the agency “adequately monitors the
safety of prescription drugs once they
are on the market.”45
Rezulin, Lotronex, Celebrex, Vioxx,
Zoloft, Prozac, and Accutane are among
the many drugs that have required postapproval labeling changes to add or
strengthen warnings. Several were removed from the market entirely.
The labeling changes were due, at
least in part, to information and pressure
derived from the tort system. As a 2002
medical journal article noted, “Many
serious [adverse drug reactions] are
discovered only after a drug has been
on the market for years. Only half of
newly discovered serious [adverse drug
reactions] are detected and documented
in the Physicians’ Desk Reference [the

The Supreme Court recognizes that tort law does
not exert the same regulatory effect as a positive
law and can apply useful pressure where the
regulatory system fails to achieve its full purposes.
Even those inside the agency have
raised serious questions about the FDA’s
ability to achieve its mission. In two recent surveys, FDA employees expressed
alarm at the improper pressure they felt
to approve new drugs.
In one survey, released by the Union
of Concerned Scientists last summer,
60 percent of FDA employees who responded knew of situations “where
commercial interests have inappropriately induced or attempted to induce the
reversal, withdrawal, or modification of
FDA determinations or actions.”43 Eighteen percent agreed that “I have been
asked, for nonscientific reasons, to inap-

doctors’ drug-labeling bible] within seven years after drug approval.”46
With all that said, do we really want
to override the tort system? Do we really want a system where imperfect regulatory agencies, all too often influenced
by the regulated industries, must do the
job on their own, while those who are
injured have no means of compensation?
To ask those questions is to answer them.
B R I A N W O L F M A N is director of the
Public Citizen Litigation Group in
Washington, D.C. The group litigates
preemption cases at all levels of the
federal and state courts. Wolfman can
be reached at brian@citizen.org.
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